By James Spinosa
ILWU International President
The container explosion at the Port of Los Angeles April 28 shattered any notion that we have security or safety in U.S. ports.
This container’s abbreviated voyage over highways, through port gates and nearly onto a ship broke almost every transportation safety and security regulation, from those of the Dept. of Transportation and U.S. Customs to the Marine Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the new Coast Guard regulations that become mandatory as of July 1—not to mention the ILWU-PMA Safety Code. It slipped through cracks wide enough to drive a 40-foot container through and yet no alarms went off. It came within minutes of causing a horrific catastrophe—one that could have been avoided if the ILWU’s security proposals were implemented.
The incident proved—if there were ever any doubt—that our employers are more concerned with productivity and profit than security and safety. Their proposals to require background checks and biometric identification cards for longshore workers represent cynical and punitive attacks on unionized workers rather than real security measures. And the changes in technology and procedures already im-plemented over the last few years have weakened port security rather than bolstering it.
The container, loaded and sealed by a private party, was bound for Micronesia on the Micronesian Heritage. But the terminal operator, Tra-Pac, didn’t get any information on where it came from or get a list of its contents. Instead, it was simply listed as “FAK,” that is, freight of all kinds. The company that leased the container to the private party had paperwork on its contents, but did not forward that to the terminal. That document showed that the container had in it a pickup truck carrying enough flammable goods that it should have been placarded as hazardous material and treated as such.
 | The TraPac incident proved that our employers are more concerned with productivity and profit than security and safety. |
The container was driven over interstate highways to the terminal without a hazardous materials placard, a violation of Dept. of Transportation regulations. The driver most likely was not licensed to haul hazardous materials, but we may never know for certain. The terminal has no record of the driver, though it allowed him entrance.
A TraPac superintendent dismissed the union’s concerns about the failure to check the driver’s identification with the less than reassuring comment that they don’t bother with such formalities anymore, because half the truckers’ licenses are phony anyway.
In the past, an FAK container was sent to the trouble window when it arrived at the terminal. There the seal was broken and its contents inspected and compared to the manifest. But the new computerized operating systems are so watered down, our marine clerks don’t have access to the information to review and compare the contents.
The container that blew up was closed with a personal padlock instead of a proper seal. In the past, ILWU workers routinely opened any improperly sealed cans, inspected the contents and then sealed them properly. They are no longer allowed to do this.
An ILWU longshore worker was driving the container on a UTR, headed shipside to load it when it exploded, blowing out the top and back doors and spewing its contents all down the aisle. If the explosion had blown out the front end instead of the back end of the container, our union brother driving could have been killed.
The system failed in every way. There was no record of who loaded the container, the seal was unverifiable, the driver wasn’t identified, the contents were unknown and not accounted for. We were fortunate to escape with so little damage.
But what if the explosion had happened a few minutes later, when the container was under the hook? A clerk, three swingmen and a foreman would likely have been close by. If it exploded while being lifted, what might have happened to the crane, the crane driver and those below on the dock? And if the explosion had waited until the container was aboard the vessel? This container, not being placarded as hazardous, was slated to be placed under another containing highly flammable fuel. Coast Guard officials told the union that if it had blown up then, it would have caused a chain reaction, likely blowing up the entire ship and killing everyone on board.
It is most disturbing to hear our employers and port authorities play down the seriousness of these safety and security lapses, telling the press it was just a small explosion and the chances of it happening again are one in a billion. Properly securing our ports is vital to protect our union brothers and sisters, our communities and our nation all at the same time.
For more than two years the ILWU has taken the lead on port security issues, insisting that our members are the first line of defense on the waterfront. We know we have had systems in place, such as container seal checks and thorough reviews of manifests, that could have prevented this container from being mishandled. We know the new computer systems are capable of giving us the information we need to do the job properly. And we know that under the new contract that is our work. But we need the tools and the training to be the eyes and ears providing safety and security, and the employers have so far refused to provide them.
The ILWU Coast Committee and its Legislative Action Committee have been lobbying in Washington, D.C. on this issue. They testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, chaired by Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) and Sen. Fritz Hollings (D-SC) about the need to do everything possible to secure U.S. port terminals and to develop contingency plans for rerouting cargo in case of an accident or terrorist incident. The subcommittee agreed those plans need to be made
The ILWU also urges the Coast Guard to take all necessary action to require employers subject to the MTSA to implement security plans immediately.
If the employers and the government don’t heed the wake-up call in this explosion, we fear much worse catastrophes to come.
